Abstract-The SIP being an application layer protocol for signaling has been considered as the most appropriate one for multimedia applications. In order to detect some collisions and replay attacks, the SIP offers built-in authentication mechanism as per its specification, designated as HTTP digest based authentication, but study reveals that it is vulnerably susceptible to heterogeneous security issues such as impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM), server spoofing and password guessing attacks. Very recently Zhang et al. proposed symmetric key based anonymous authentication scheme for SIP. They claimed the scheme to provide privacy and anonymity, but the analysis in this paper expose that Zhang et al.'s scheme does not provide dynamic identity hence it is not anonymous. Furthermore, we proposed an improved anonymous authentication scheme for SIP. The scheme is more secure as compared with Zhang et al.'s scheme.
I. Introduction
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) offer audio, video and multimedia services over IP networks. The rapid spread, utilization and success of VoIP is hidden in its flexible implementation and cost effectiveness. To maintain this rapid spread and success of VoIP, many flexible, efficient and secure signaling protocols have been proposed. As the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) has also implemented SIP in its architectural framework to provide IP based multimedia services. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is therefore most widely used among other protocols due to its lightweight scalable and flexible nature. It is text based application-layer control protocol and is utilized to create, manage and terminate sessions among participants. No doubt SIP is an attractive package for authentication along with its impressive features but it is somehow vulnerable to various kind of security threats, and it is due to direct inheritance from HTTP Digest authentication. In recent years researchers are busy to develop secure authentication protocol for SIP but it proved out to be a challenging task due to two major reasons. One is that it should be secure enough to provide protection for IP based networks against various types of threats and other is that it should not be compute intensive because VoIP systems cannot afford the latency due to intensive computations.
Performance and security are inversely proportional to each other, therefore it is a challenging task to introduce an authentication protocol that provide a trade off between the two. A number of prevailing authentication schemes have been proposed [1] - [36] . The schemes proposed on the notion of public key cryptography [1] - [4] , [7] - [9] , [13] - [19] , [32] - [34] are more expensive in terms of computation and communication cost. Furthermore, such schemes incurs more delay and latency as compared with symmetric key primitive based schemes [20] - [28] , [35] , [36] . So public key based schemes are not suitable for delay sensitive and resource constrained environments. While the schemes based on symmetric key primitives are more vulnerable to a number of attacks [37] . A number of such schemes are also having correctness issues [38] , [39] .
Zhang et al. [40] recently presented a lightweight authentication protocol for SIP using biometrics characteristics and claimed that their proposed protocol is an initial step as it completely preserve the privacy of user identity and biometric characteristics. But our analysis reveals that Zhang et al. scheme doesn't provide dynamic ID. An adversary, by just analyzing the channel can easily verify whether two sessions are initiated by the same user.
II. Zhang et al.'s scheme
Recently Zhang et al. proposed a lightweight privacy preserving authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP based VoIP. The scheme comprises of three phases registration phase, authentication phase and password change phase. To easily understand the scheme we have listed the notations used through out the paper in Table I . Zhang et al.'s scheme is shown in Fig. 1 and is elaborated in following subsections:
A. Registration phase
When a user wants to register with SIP server in order to become a new legal user, it performs following steps:
Step 1:
U i chooses its user-name ID i and password P W i and generates a biometric template BT i . Then using random integer r it calculates
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The SIP server S selects random secret key s,
. S then maintains a record of (ID i , h(.)) in a specific table known as identity table. The server stores the secure information (I, K, L) in the smart card and issues it to user U i through secure channel.
Step 3:
On getting the smart card the user
B. Authentication phase
Authentication phase as shown in Figure 1 involves the following step:
Step 1: U i enters his ID i and P W i after inserting the smart card into reader then scan iris of user in order to generate biometric template BT * i . U i then extract random integer r using ID i , P W i and Z the secret information stored in the smart card. Smart card then uses n and BT * i to find X . Then it compares the X and X and if the match score exceeds a predetermined threshold value the authentication process instantly terminates otherwise the smart card computes J using X, K, ID i and
? L) and if it holds then server selects a random integer m and computes
After that user sends a request REQU EST (I, R 2 ) to server over public channel.
Step 2:
In order to know the ID i of user the S decrypts I with its secret key s and checks it in the identity 
III. Cryptanalysis of Zhang et al.'s scheme
This section shows that Zhang et al.'s scheme lacks strong anonymity and is vulnerable to replay and denial of services attacks.
A. Lacks Strong Anonymity
Privacy and anonymity protects user's sensitive information from the adversary, the leakage of such information may enables the adversary to analyze victim's lifestyle, preferences, the social circles and so on. Importantly, the expose of such information in wireless environments can help the adversary to track the current location and login history of the target[UFO2F]. To achieve user anonymity, the typical approach is to employ dynamic ID, where the real identity of the user is covered in session related parameters. An authentication scheme is said to preserve anonymity and privacy if it possesses two properties (i) Real identity of user should not revealed to an adversary, (ii) User should have dynamic identity for each session so that adversary cannot distinguish whether two different sessions are initiated by same user. In Zhang et al.'s scheme the server using its secret key encrypts user's real ID and stores it in the smart card. The user sends this encrypted ID in each authentication request, since in each session same ID is used, so Zhang et al.'s scheme does not employ the dynamic ID. The adversary can easily trace whether two different sessions are initiated by same user.
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B. Replay Attack
The scheme is vulnerable to replay attack. Adversary can intercept the REQU EST (I, C 2 ) and later replay this REQU EST (I, C 2 ), of course adversary will not be able to share the session key with server, but server can be overwhelmed by too many authentication requests sent intentionally by the adversary, which may exhaust the computation power of server or the user may face denial of services.
IV. Proposed Scheme
The major problem with the Zhang et al. scheme is that identity of the user remain same for different sessions therefore an adversary can easily guess that the two different sessions are initiated by same user which nullify their claim of user anonymity and privacy. The proposed idea is to keep the user's identity dynamic to make it impossible for the adversary to guess initiation of two session by same user. Note that the password change phase is considered same as discussed in zhang et al.'s scheme but the registration and authentication phase of proposed scheme are as under:
A. Registration phase
For registration a new legal user performs the following steps:
The first step is similar to Zhang et al.'s scheme as described in subsection II-A .
The SIP server selects random secret key, com-
. SIP server then maintains a record of (ID i , h(.)) in a specific table known as identity table. The server stores the secure information (I, K, L) in the smart card and issues it to user U i through secure channel.
The user U i stores (Z, X, h(.)) in the smart card secretly. The Smart card finally contains
B. Authentication phase
The authentication phase involves the following steps as shown in Figure 2 , which are as follows:
Step 1: U i enters his ID i and P W i after inserting the smart card into reader then scan iris of user in order to generate biometric template BT * i . U i then extract random integer r using ID i , P W i and Z the secret information stored in the smartcard. Smartcard then uses n and BT * i to find X . Then it compares the X and X and if the match score exceeds a predetermined threshold value the authentication process instantly terminates otherwise the smart card computes J using X, K, ID i and P W i . Then it checks E J (P W i ⊕X⊕ID i = ? L) and if it holds then server selects a random integer m and computes R 1 = ((P W i ⊕ X ⊕ ID i )||m) and R 2 = E J (K||ID i ||R 1 ). After that user sends a request REQU EST (I, R 2 ) to server over public channel.
In order to know the ID i of user the S decrypts I with its secret key s and checks it in the identity V. Security comparison Security of proposed scheme is evaluated with respect to other related protocols of Zhang et al. [40] and Kumari et al. [28] . Stolen-verifier along with insider attack are impossible because our scheme does not store password or maintain table on server. Smart card contain entropy protected biometric template, so even in case of theft or lost it is impossible for the adversary to extract the stored biometric characteristics. Identity of user is not even protected by ciphertext but all it is kept dynamic so that adversary fails to differentiate that the two sessions are initiated by the same user or not. Therefore, our protocol actually provide the user anonymity. While Zhang et al.'s scheme does not provide proper user anonymity and Kumari et al.'s protocol does not resists smart card stolen attack.
VI. Performance comparison
Performance is compared with respect to two major operations which are symmetric encryption/ decryption (denoted as T Sen ) and one way hash function (denoted as T Owh ). Proposed scheme just incurs an extra T Sen operation as compared to Zhang et al.'s scheme [40] . While Zhang et al.'s scheme is does not provide user untraceability additionally Kumari et al.'s scheme [40] is more lightweight but it does not resists smart card stolen attack. Performance comparison is solicited in Table II .
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have cryptanalyzed a recent authentication scheme. We have proven that Zhang et al.'s scheme does not provide user traceability and is vulnerable to replay attack Furthermore, we proposed an improved biometric based authentication scheme. Proposed scheme is robust against several attacks and provides user untraceability while having slight higher computation cost. 
